Heavy weapons supplies to Ukraine in the context of the conflict´s power dynamic
The domino effect caused by Poland's decision to send Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine is now turning into a coalition of several countries (Finland, UK) pledging to send their main battle tanks to Ukraine and counting. This development represents an important breakthrough in military equipment supplies to Ukraine, defending itself from invasion. NATO's earlier reluctance to deliver heavy weaponry now seems to be slowly washing out, and Ukraine might actually put a tank brigade together for its planned new round of counter-offensive.
According to breakingdefense.com, Europe holds an arsenal of over 2,000 German-manufactured vehicles, with operators besides Poland, including Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Turkey. However, on Jan 20, 2023 the Contact group meeting will determine the scale of help.
By contrast, the CEO of Rheinmetall stated that the company can deliver two tanks by 2024 as the company´s production capacities are already full. This brings us to a serious concern about European military-industrial production ability, which should be of major concern to the policy-makers. Europe is unlikely to build a formidable deterrent in the short and possibly not even in the mid-term( definitely not at the current stage) as there is a dire need to expand the military-industrial capacities.
As far as the shift in willingness to supply Ukraine with heavy weaponry is concerned, after the US pledged to supply Ukraine with AMVs and Patriot systems, discussed supplies of main battle tanks are offering several clues of what might've happened behind the scenes.
Watchful observers of the conflict will recall signs of diplomatic efforts before Christmas. Turkey and the US were hinting at potential peace talks. Peace talks highly likely failed as aerial raids intensified and talks of a Russian renewed offensive prevailed. Therefore, the Kremlin is likely still focusing on maximalist military goals.
Ukraine has a chance to conduct a successful counter-offensive that can shift gravitas in its favour once and for all. The conflict is exhausting all involved parties, and with all the economic issues, no one can afford to sit in the trenches for the next few years. Therefore if the allied intelligence assesses the situation as plausible to turn the tide, the Western leaders might think it is time to throw in more powerful weapons and finish this war once and for all.
New movements in the Russian army, such as the appointment of Nikophonov and Gerasimov(later this week, I will make an individual assessment of personal changes in the Russian army). Gerasimov opposed the invasion, his appointment, therefore, suggests that Russia is either desperate and, thus, point 2 is correct. Or Russia is serious about the new offensive and will throw Ukraine as much force as possible as it will try to end the conflict in the coming months. In such a case, the new supplies would make sense, though the main tanks are a tactical advantage for the attacking army, not the defending one. If this scenario is correct, then we will face major escalation in the coming months with heavy fighting on both sides. Both Ukraine and Russia re-armed with heavy weaponry, and both will try to end the war during this escalation.
Russians gained momentum on the front line, and Ukraine needs the West to lean in more.
This is the least likely scenario out of all four, as the Russian army is making slow advances with high attrition rates (though it is better not to marginalise these advances). On the other hand, Ukraine is doing very well in defending recently gained positions along the front line. The Russian army is heavily scrutinised by private intelligence in Russia. Telegram channels wouldn't be full of criticism if the Russian army performed well.
All four scenarios are possible, the next weeks/months will show which one was the most realistic.
